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THE LAW OF CONSTRUCTION BONDS IN ARKANSAS: A
REVIEW
David G. Paul*
In 1929, J.S. Waterman, the dean of the Arkansas School of Law,
published an article in the first edition of the Arkansas Law Bulletin.
Entitled "Construction Surety Bonds in Arkansas,"1 the article traced
the law governing construction bonds in Arkansas. Since the publica-
tion of that article, the construction industry in Arkansas has flour-
ished, and the law governing the construction industry has changed and
expanded.
Because of their precarious nature, construction contracts have
naturally fostered much litigation over their performance. Initial un-
derbidding by the contractor, unforeseen problems with the construc-
tion, and other difficulties often result in delay in completion, faulty
construction, or outright default by the contractor. The owner, the con-
tractor, and the lender involved in the project may try to resolve any
dispute; however, the addition of the claims of subcontractors and ma-
terialmen often forecloses any possibility of successfully completing the
project.
One possible solution is for the contractor to provide surety bonds
to insure its performance of the contract. Essentially contracts, surety
bonds are peculiar in that their terms and obligations are governed by
statutes and common law which are unique to surety bonds. This arti-
cle will explore those statutes and precedents in Arkansas which affect
construction surety bonds.
I. The Surety Bond
Broadly defined, suretyship is a contractual relationship whereby
one entity answers for the obligations of another. For the purposes of
this article, however, the definition needs refining. Often described as a
* Member of the law firm of Skokos, Simpson, Graham & Rainwater, P.A. in Little Rock,
Arkansas. B.A., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1981; J.D.. University of Arkansas at
Little Rock, 1984; law clerk for Associate Justice George Rose Smith of the Arkansas Supreme
Court, 1984-1985.
1. Waterman, Construction Surety Bonds in Arkansas, I UNIV. OF ARK. LAW SCHOOL
BULL. 59 (1930).
2. A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP, § 1.1 (5th ed. 1951).
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tripartite relationship, a surety bond is a three-way contract between
the surety, the principal, and the obligee that secures the performance
of the obligations of the principal under a separate contract by obligat-
ing the surety to pay a penal sum upon the principal's default.3 Con-
struction surety bonds were created as a means of protecting those in-
volved with the construction of public improvements. Recognizing the
vulnerability of subcontractors in light of court decisions which prohib-
ited liens against public improvements, governmental entities began to
require the posting of a bond to secure payments to a subcontractor.
Thereafter, private contractors utilized this practice and expanded the
protection into a method of securing the performance of the construc-
tion contract as well as the payment to subcontractors, laborers, and
materialmen. 4 Even so, the Arkansas Supreme Court has pointed out
that a contract of ordinary suretyship is not the equivalent of an in-
demnity agreement, and the court has recognized that the obligations
of the surety are limited to those of the principal under the contract
between the principal and the obligee. 5
The most common types of bonds used in the construction industry
are the bid bond, the performance bond, and the payment bond.' The
bid bond is a surety bond which insures that the contractor will enter
into a contract by paying the penal sum or the owner's actual damages
if the contractor fails to enter into the contract or fails to post the
required performance or payment bonds.7 insuring that the contractor
will complete his obligation under the construction contract, perform-
ance bonds obligate the surety to complete the contract or pay damages
3. Id. at § 1.4; Petro, The Fundamental Rights and Responsibilities of the Contractor's
Surety-What Happens When the Contractor Defaults?, CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS 1985, 507,
at 509 (1985) 261 REAL EST. L. AND PRACTICE L. INST. (hereinafter Petro).
4. I. RICHTER AND R. MITCHELL, HANDBOOK OF CONSTRUCTION LAW AND CLAIMS 268
(1982); Hart & Kane, What Every Real Estate Lawyer Should Know About Payment and Per-
formance Bonds, 17 REAL PROP. PROB. AND TR. J. 674 (1982).
5. Where the contract takes the form of ordinary suretyship, "the agreement of the
surety is that he will do the thing which the principal has undertaken," whereas, "in
indemnity contracts the engagement is to make good and sure another from loss upon
some obligation which he has incurred, or is about to incur, to a third person, and is not
as in guaranty and suretyship a promise to one whom another is answerable."
Fausett Builders, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 220 Ark. 301, 305, 247 S.W.2d 469, 471 (1952)
(court's emphasis) (quoting Hall v. Equitable Sur. Co., 126 Ark. 535, 539-40, 191 S.W. 32, 34
(1917)). The court held that the surety was not liable for attorney fees incurred by owner since
such an obligation was not a part of the construction contract.
6. Petro, supra note 3, at 509.
7. Id. at 510; Samson & Shahinian, Suing the Surety, in CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION: REP-
RESENTING THE OWNER 141, at 143-44 (1984).
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up to the penal sum of the bond upon the contractor's default.8 A pay-
ment bond obligates the surety to pay subcontractors, materialmen,
and laborers for material and services furnished in performance of the
construction contract.' Again, the limit of the surety's liability is the
penal sum stated in the bond.
Generally, the surety's liability is governed by the terms of the
bond and the construction contract. Since the liability of the surety is
predicated upon the obligations of the principal under the contract, the
surety bond and the contract are construed together as one instru-
ment. 10 The liability of the surety will not extend beyond that of the
principal, 1 and any defense of the principal to the main contract will
normally be available to the surety. 2 Nevertheless, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court has held that a surety contract is essentially one of insur-
ance, and its interpretation should be governed by the laws of insur-
ance. 8 Also, the court has held that it is to be construed most strongly
against a commercial surety.1
4
II. Discharge
Aside from the defenses to the main contract which the surety
may assert,16 the surety may contend that its obligations under the
bond have been discharged by the actions of the obligee. A primary
defense of the surety, discharge will be pleaded if any action of the
obligee has exonerated the surety of liability. Actions such as altera-
8. Petro, supra note 3, at 510. In Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp. v. A.W. Johnson Co.,
234 Ark. 806, 354 S.W.2d 733 (1962), the court further refined the term "performance bond" by
distinguishing between it and an indemnity bond. Therein, a supplier of materials sued the surety
on a bond which indemnified the owner "against loss or damage directly arising by reason of the
failure of the Principal faithfully to perform the contract." Id. at 809, 354 S.W.2d at 734. Citing
Pine Bluff Lodge v. Sanders, 86 Ark. 291, 111 S.W. 255 (1908), the court held that an indemnity
bond as in that case provided protection only to the obligee and did not allow any causes of action
by other third parties, such as materialmen. The court further stated that although the terms of
the construction contract were incorporated by reference into the surety bond the bond did guar-
antee performance of the contract. It was a private bond which did not extend beyond its terms.
See also Annotation, Right of Person Furnishing Material or Labor to Maintain Action on Con-
tractor's Bond to Owner or Public Body, or on Owner's Bond to Mortgagee, 77 A.L.R. 21 (1932).
9. Petro, supra note 3, at 511.
10. Fausett Builders, Inc. v. Globe Indem. Co., 220 Ark. 301, 304-05, 247 S.W.2d 469, 471
(1952).
11. Id.; Peay v. Southern Sur. Co., 141 Ark. 265, 216 S.W. 722 (1919).
12. Petro, supra note 3, at 516.
13. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Higgins, 117 Ark. 372, 174 S.W. 1150 (1915).
14. American Bonding Co. v. Board of Street Improvement District No. 82, 187 Ark. 300,
59 S.W.2d 605 (1933); Consol. Indem. & Ins. Co. v. State, 184 Ark. 581, 43 S.W.2d 240 (1931).
15. See generally, A. STEARNS, supra note 2.
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tions in the principal contract, extensions of time to complete the pro-
ject, or release of the principal, discharge the surety from his obligation
if the surety has not consented to such actions." Consent will not nor-
mally be implied by the surety's mere knowledge or acquiescence but
must be shown by some affirmative action of the surety.1 7
A major source of contention in construction litigation has been
whether the original contract under which the surety is liable has been
altered by the obligee and the principal. This type of discharge is based
on the theory that the surety is entitled to rely upon the terms of the
original contract, and any alteration in the contract likewise alters his
obligation, thereby releasing the surety from liability.18 Nevertheless,
the courts have limited this theory to "material" alterations in the con-
tract" since the right to make immaterial changes is implied in all
building contracts.2 0
The test of materiality, as applied by the Arkansas Supreme
Court, is whether the alterations place the surety in a position different
from what it promised to guarantee. In Hinton v. Stanton, 2 the owner
and a contractor entered into a contract to build a house for $3,165.
Later, the contract was altered to provide for a porte cochere for an
additional $158.50. After the contractor defaulted, the owner sued the
surety for $1,591.63, the sum required to complete the contract in ex-
cess of the original contract. Defending on the basis of material altera-
tion, the surety contended that the additional work released the surety
from its obligation. The question that concerned the court was whether
the additional work was a material change in the construction contract.
16. See generally A. STEARNS, supra note 2, §§ 6.1-.55, at 104-99.
17. Union Indem. Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. 752, 18 S.W.2d 327 (1929).
18. A. STEARNS, supra note 2, § 6.2, at 107-08. See also O'Neal v. Kelley, 65 Ark. 550, 47
S.W. 409 (1898).
19. Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 122 Ark. 522, 184 S.W. 54 (1916); Hinton v. Stan-
ton, 112 Ark. 207, 165 S.W. 299 (1914); O'Neal v. Kelley, 65 Ark. 550, 47 S.W. 409 (1898); A.
STEARNS, supra note 2, § 6.3, at 109. See Carroll-Boone Water District v. M & P Equipment Co.,
280 Ark. 560, 661 S.W.2d 345 (1983). The court has also held that the surety is not discharged
where the changes were allowed by the contract even if the changes were material. Kerby v. Road
Improvement Dist., 159 Ark. 21, 251 S.W. 356 (1923). See also Altman v. Sproles, 161 Ark. 128,
255 S.W. 573 (1923).
20. As noted in Hinton v. Stanton,
It is contemplated in all building contracts that small and immaterial changes will be
suggested, and will become necessary in the progress of the construction of a building,
and this fact is necessarily known to one who becomes surety upon a contractor's bond,
and if the changes made are slight and immaterial, the surety is not released.
Hinton v. Stanton, 112 Ark. 207, 211, 165 S.W. 299, 300 (1914). See also Eureka Stone Co. v.
First Christian Church, 86 Ark. 212, 110 S.W. 1042 (1908) (changes which are not material or
are authorized by the terms of the contract do not discharge the surety's obligation).
21. 112 Ark. 207, 165 S.W. 299 (1914).
[Vol. 9:333
CONSTRUCTION BONDS
The porte cochere was not a part of the plan covered by the bond, and
no liability could have arisen against the surety out of its construction.
However, if its construction involved some change in the building con-
tract, which a jury should find to be of a material nature, such change
would invalidate the bond, unless the consent of the surety was se-
cured. But if the porte cochere could be and was attached to the
building, without involving any material change in the plan of the
building, then the fact that it was constructed would not render the
bond invalid; and under the circumstances of this case, the test of
materiality of the change is this: Could the owner have made a sepa-
rate contract for the porte cochere and could that contract have been
performed without materially changing the contract which [the con-
tractor] had made, and upon which appellee was surety? If this could
have been done, then the contract for the porte cochere is an addi-
tional contract and not a change in the original contract. 2
This test was later repeated by the court."
Concerned with the failure of the contractor to obtain builder's
risk insurance as required by the construction contract, the court in
Carroll-Boone Water District v. M & P Equipment Co.,24 again em-
phasized the question of whether the surety's position had been altered.
The court characterized the problem as a difference between a material
alteration and breach of contract.
In determining whether an alteration is material the courts look to see
whether the surety has been placed in a position different from that
which it promised to guarantee. The alteration is not material unless
the surety is placed in the position of doing more than the undertak-
ing contained in the performance bond."5
However, in this case the failure to obtain the builder's risk policy was
only a breach of contract and not a material alteration. As such, the
surety was not released from its obligation and the owner was entitled
to recover on the bond.
Closely related to discharge by alteration of the contract, the
22. Id. at 212-13, 165 S.W. at 300-01.
23. In Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Terry, 122 Ark. 522, 184 S.W. 54 (1916), the surety
appealed from a judgment in favor of the owners arising out of the construction of a six-story
building. Repeating the test of materiality set forth in Hinton v. Stanton, the court stated that the
evidence demonstrated that the changes could not be constructed independently of the main con-
tract but necessarily involved material alterations in the original contract. Since the surety had
not consented to these material alterations, the surety was discharged from its obligation under
the bond. Therefore, the court reversed and dismissed.
24. 280 Ark. 560, 661 S.W.2d 345 (1983).
25. Id. at 569, 661 S.W.2d at 350 (citations omitted).
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owner's failure to abide by the terms of the construction contact may
also result in the discharge of the surety's obligation. Since the con-
struction contract's terms serve as the basis of the surety's obligation,
the courts have required the owner to strictly follow those terms or to
risk forfeiting the bond's protection.26 This issue has most frequently
arisen when the owner has failed to retain a percentage of the contract
price as security against the contractor's default.27 The court has re-
fused, however, to allow a complete discharge when the deviation from
the contract terms resulted in little or no harm to the surety.2s
One question which has not been definitely answered by the Ar-
kansas courts is whether the premature progress payments to the con-
tractor by the owner will operate as a complete or pro tanto discharge
of the surety's obligations. The Arkansas cases on this point hold both
ways without reconciling the conflict.2 9 The modern rule would dis-
charge the surety only to the extent of the loss or impairment of his
security, 0 and one federal court has followed the pro tanto rule in de-
ciding an Arkansas case. 1
Discharge of the surety can also be accomplished by releasing the
26. Bankers' Sur. Co. v. Watt, 118 Ark. 492, 177 S.W. 20 (1915) (failure of owner to give
notice of default within 10 days held to discharge surety). Cf National Sur. Co. v. Long, 79 Ark.
523, 96 S.W. 745 (1906).
27. Eureka Stone Co. v. First Christian Church, 86 Ark. 212, 110 S.W. 1042 (1908); La-
whon v. Toors, 73 Ark. 473, 84 S.W. 636 (1905); Marree v. Ingle, 69 Ark. 126, 61 S.W. 369
(1901).
28. In Roland v. Lindsey, 104 Ark. 49, 146 S.W. 115 (1912), the sureties contended that the
failure of the owner to obtain fire insurance as required by the contract discharged their obliga-
tion. The court disagreed noting that no loss by fire had occurred during the progress of the
building. "As the bondsmen sustained no injury by reason of the breach of the contract in regard
to insurance, they are not entitled to be relieved from liability for breaches of the contract on the
part of the principal." Id. at 57, 146 S.W. at 118.
29. The surety in Marree v. Ingle, 69 Ark. 126, 61 S.W. 369 (1901), claimed a complete
discharge because of the failure of the owner to retain a percentage of the contract price. The final
installment due the contractor was $333.34 out of which the owner deducted several bills which he
had paid. The balance of $192.89 was then paid to the contractor one day earlier than required by
the contract. When sued by the owner to discharge a lien by a materialman for $449.75, the
sureties claimed that the premature payment worked a complete discharge of their obligation. The
court held, however, that the sureties were discharged only of the extent of their injuries. "[W]hen
by the act of the creditor the surety has been deprived of the benefit of a fund for the payment of
a debt, and the contract by which the surety is bound is not changed, he is only discharged to the
extent that he is injured as in such cases." Id. at 129, 61 S.W. at 370-71.
However, in the later cases of Lawhon v. Toors, 73 Ark. 473, 84 S.W. 636 (1905) and Na-
tional Sur. Co. v. Long, 79 Ark. 523, 96 S.W. 745 (1906), the court held that premature pay-
ments to the contractor operated as a complete discharge of the surety. Neither of those cases
distinguished the holding of Marree v. Ingle, supra.
30. A. STEARNS, supra note 2, § 6.8, at 124 and cases cited therein. See also 72 C.J.S.
Principal and Surety § 206 (1951).
31. Reid v. Miles Constr. Corp., 307 F.2d 214 (8th Cir. 1962).
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contractor without the permission of the surety. The surety's obligation,
being merely ancillary to the main contract, is discharged if the con-
tractor is released from liability by the owner."2 In Union Indemnity
Co. v. Benton County Lumber Co.,3 3 for example, a surety company
issued two surety bonds covering separate paving districts projects of
the contractor. After completion of one of the projects, a materialman
filed suit against the paving district, the contractors, and the surety to
recover monies owed to it by the contractor.3 " In an effort to settle the
suit, all of the parties except the surety met to negotiate a settlement,
and during this negotiation, an agent of the surety telephoned the at-
torney for the district and stated that before the surety would do any-
thing further the amounts due the claimants would have to be settled
and the suit dismissed with prejudice. Thereafter, a settlement was con-
cluded with the materialman and the suit was dismissed. After the sec-
ond project was concluded, the materialman once again found the con-
tractor owing money on its account, and the materialman filed suit
against the district, the contractor, and the surety asking, among other
relief, that the surety be held liable on its bond on the first project to
pay for the note it received in settlement of the first suit. The trial
court held the surety liable on its bond, but the Arkansas Supreme
Court reversed. Noting that the settlement had been negotiated and
concluded without active participation by the surety, the court held
that the surety's obligation was erased once the contractor's obligation
was likewise erased by the settlement.8 5 Therefore, the surety was no
longer liable on the first bond.
III. Standing
Another possible defense of the surety is that the claimant lacks
standing to enforce the surety's obligation. For the most part, the
surety has based this defense upon the contention that the claimant
must sue through the contractor since the liability of the surety is pred-
32. A. STEARNS, supra note 2, § 6.42, at 174.
33. 179 Ark. 752, 18 S.W.2d 327 (1929).
34. Id. at 754, 18 S.W.2d at 328.
35. In this case the principals have made a settlement by which the debt for which the
surety was liable was extinguished and another and different obligation created, to suit
their convenience, and the surety, appellant not having consented thereto, was dis-
charged. And consent will not be implied by mere knowledge of and acquiescence in the
terms of the settlement, but there must be some affirmative action by the party to be
bound.
Id. at 761, 18 S.W.2d at 330 (citations omitted).
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icated upon the liability of the contractor.3 6 At least in the area of
public statutory bonds, the Arkansas Supreme Court has rejected this
contention by construing the terms of such bonds liberally. 7 Since stat-
utes giving materialmen and laborers liens for their work do not apply
to public projects, the court has reasoned that the bonds provide the
only available protection to cover the default of the contractor." Only
by construing the bonds liberally can claimants receive adequate pro-
tection. One such case was National Surety Corp. v. Ideal Lumber
Co.." After a materialman sued the surety to recover for the sale of
materials and tools to the contractor, the surety argued that the con-
tractor's liability must be established before the materialman could ob-
tain a judgment against the surety. The court held otherwise. "We
have held that laborers and materialmen may, in cases involving public
improvements, sue the surety on the bond of the contractor without
making the contractor a party."'40
On the other hand, failure of a contractor to be properly licensed
can bar the recovery of the contractor from the surety. As required by
section 71-713 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated, any contractor en-
tering into a construction contract wherein the cost equals or exceeds
$20,000 must be licensed by the State Licensing Board for Contractors;
otherwise, the contractor is barred from bringing any action to enforce
any provision of the contract.41 The Arkansas Supreme Court has re-
36. See, e.g., National Sur. Corp. v. Ideal Lumber Co., 249 Ark. 545, 460 S.W.2d 55 (1970).
37. Holcomb v. American Sur. Co., 184 Ark. 449, 42 S.W.2d 765 (1931).
38. Id. at 454, 42 S.W.2d at 767-68. Also noted in Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Henslee,
163 Ark. 492, 260 S.W. 414 (1924), was the dual purpose of statutory bonds.
The bond sued on was given for two purposes. In the first place, it was given to secure
to the commissioners of the district the faithful performance of the contract of the
principal contractor with the district; and, in the second place, to protect third persons
from whom the contractor may obtain materials or labor used in the construction of the
improved road. Acts of this kind are intended to furnish the obligation of a bond as a
substitute for the security which might be obtained by a mechanic's lien, such liens not
being given in the case of public works.
Id. at 497, 260 S.W. at 416. See also National Sur. Corp. v. Edison, 240 Ark. 641, 401 S.W.2d
754 (1966) (Smith, J., concurring).
39. 249 Ark. 545, 460 S.W.2d 55 (1970).
40. Id. at 546, 460 S.W.2d at 56 (citing Holcomb v. American Sur. Co., 184 Ark. 449, 42
S.W.2d 765 (1931)). However, the court has held that a lender who advanced money to a subcon-
tractor on a public contract to pay materialmen and laborers did not gain the status as a "holder
of labor and material claims" under the predecessor to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-605 (1979). Ayres
& Graves v. Ellis, 185 Ark. 818, 49 S.W.2d 1056 (1932). The statute has since been changed to
delete this language.
41. Section 71-713(A) provides in part:
Any contractor who for a fixed price, commission, fee or wage, attempts to or submits a
bid or bids to construct or contracts to construct, or undertakes to construct, or assumes
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lied upon this statute to uphold trial courts' dismissals of suits by unli-
censed contractors against contentions that the statute was not in-
tended to apply to unlicensed subcontractors4 2 and that the contractor
was a mere employee of the owner." The court has also rejected the
argument that the statute was not intended to be used by prime con-
tractors as a shield from an unlicensed subcontractor.4 4 However, the
court has held that the licensing statute does not apply to an unlicensed
contractor when the main contract is with the United States Govern-
charge in a supervisory capacity or otherwise, of the construction, erection, alteration or
repair, of any building, highway, sewer, grading or any other improvement or structure,
when the cost of the work to be done by the contractor, including but not limited to
labor and materials, is twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) or more, without first hav-
ing procured a license to engage in the business of contracting in this state, . . . shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable to a fine of not less than one
hundred dollars ($100.00), nor more than two hundred dollars ($200.00) for each of-
fense, each day to constitute a separate offense. No action may be brought either at law
or in equity to enforce any provision of any contract entered into in violation of this act
[§§ 71-701-71-720].
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-713(A) (Supp. 1985).
42. In Bird v. Pan Western Corp., 261 Ark. 56, 546 S.W.2d 417 (1977), an unlicensed sub-
contractor went bankrupt after completing its contract to install heating and air conditioning in
some Little Rock apartments. The trustee in bankruptcy then brought suit to foreclose upon the
mechanics' and materialmen's liens of the subcontractor on the project. The trustee argued that a
subcontractor who supplies labor and materials to the prime contractor is not a "contractor" as
defined by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-701 (1979). Rather, the term "contractor" in the licensing
statute was intended to apply only when the contractor contracts directly with the owner. Review-
ing the definition of contractor in § 71-701, the court refused to accept the trustee's construction
of the statute. Under its subcontract, the subcontractor was to furnish all labor and materials to
complete the heating and air conditioning of the apartments in accordance with the plans and
specifications and was obligated to correct any defect to the owner's satisfaction.
Under these circumstances [the subcontractor], for a fixed price, contracted to con-
struct, or assumed charge, in a supervisory capacity or otherwise, of the construction,
erection, or alteration or had constructed, erected or altered, under its direction a build-
ing, improvement or other structure and the cost of the work to be done was in excess
of $20,000.
Bird, 261 Ark. at 62, 546 S.W.2d at 420 (court's emphasis). Therefore, the licensing statute
would apply to a subcontractor.
43. In Davidson v. Smith, 258 Ark. 969, 530 S.W.2d 356 (1975), the appellee verbally
agreed with the appellant to restore a residence to its original condition. After completion, the
appellee presented a bill for $57,552.40 which the appellant refused to pay. Deducting a pre-
payment for materials, the appellee sued for the balance and received a judgment for $8,511.87
plus interest. The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed. Against the assertion that the appellee was
only an employee of the owner and not a contractor as defined by § 71-701, the court noted that
the appellee had subcontracted for labor and materials, had contracted with the owner on a cost
plus 10% basis, and had exercised overall control at the worksite. "We find the evidence prepon-
derates that Smith's activities, pursuant to his cost plus agreement, were not that of a mere fore-
man or employee and further that Smith was a 'contractor' as defined in § 71-701 and within the
standards enunciated in [Arkansas State Licensing Board v. Lane, 214 Ark. 312, 215 S.W.2d 707
(1951)]." Davidson, 258 Ark. at 975, 530 S.W.2d at 359.
44. Williams v. Joyner-Cranford-Burke Constr. Co., 285 Ark. 134, 685 S.W.2d 503 (1985).
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ment.4" The end result is that the failure of the contractor to be li-
censed may bar recovery from the surety.
4"
One question yet to be answered by the court is whether a licensed
subcontractor is barred from recovery against the surety of the prime
contractor if his prime contractor is unlicensed. Strict interpretation of
section 71-713 would indicate that recovery would be barred. The sec-
tion clearly says that "[njo action may be brought either at law or in
equity to enforce any provision of any contract entered into in violation
of this Act."47 Enforcement of the subcontract through the prime con-
tractor's surety bond would necessarily involve the enforcement of the
prime contract, a contract which cannot be enforced under section 71-
713. However, a better position would allow recovery under the prime
contractor's bond. First, the court has indicated that, at least when
public projects are involved, the liability of the surety is independent of
that of the contractor. 48 Second, the surety should not be able to shield
itself from its obligation since it approved the contractor's qualifications
by issuing the bond. Third, public policy would not be served. The sub-
contractor, having complied with the licensing requirements, has done
all within its power required by statute. Refusing to enforce the
surety's obligation would not advance public policy since this action
would reward noncompliance while penalizing those who have complied
with the licensing law.
IV. Statutes of Limitations
The statutes of limitations have proved to be a major obstacle in
recovering on a construction bond. Although the normal statute which
45. Although dismissing the suit as to the surety on the basis that the surety bond was a
Miller Act bond under 40 U.S.C.A. § 270a-270e (1986) and therefore the trial court was without
jurisdiction, the court in Airport Constr. & Materials, Inc. v. Bivens, 279 Ark. 161, 649 S.W.2d
830 (1983), held that the licensing statute did not prevent an unlicensed subcontractor from main-
taining a suit when the main contract was between the prime contractor and the United States
Government. The federal government, not the State of Arkansas, had the ultimate power to deter-
mine the qualifications of contractors working on federal projects. "Were a government contract
subject to interruption because of varying state requirements, when the federal government has
already determined that the contractor has the capability to fulfill its requirements and control the
project to its satisfaction, the supremacy policy would be largely undermined." Id. at 165, 649
S.W.2d at 832. See also Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187 (1956).
46. See, e.g., Williams v. Joyner-Cranford-Burke Constr. Co., 285 Ark. 134, 685 S.W.2d 503
(1985); Airport Constr. & Materials, Inc. v. Bivens, 279 Ark. 161, 649 S.W.2d 830 (1983).
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 71-713(A) (Supp. 1985).




applies to surety bonds imposes a five-year limitation,49 bonds required
by statute have a considerably shorter limitation period. Under these
statutes, the claimant has only six months from the date of final pay-
ment on the contract to file suit.50
This considerable difference in the two time periods has created a
principal defense for the surety, a defense which was cited by the court
in Benton County Lumber Co. v. National Surety Co."1 In that case,
the appellant brought suit after the six-month limitation but contended
that the bond was not a statutory bond inasmuch as the bond was
neither filed nor approved by the circuit clerk as required by statute. 2
The court, however, found the bond to be statutory and thus controlled
by the six-month statute of limitations.
We think it clearly appears that the parties intended a statutory bond,
and it was executed in all respects as required by the statute, except it
was not approved by the clerk. . . . [T]he mere fact that they failed
to file it with the clerk would not prevent it from being a statutory
bond. 8
As required by section 51-636, the six-month period begins to run
from the date of the "final payment." The term "final payment" was
the focal point in Tucker Paving Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp." In that
decision the contract required the owner to retain five percent of the
contract funds due the prime contractor for the purpose of remedying
any minor defects in the project. On February 8, 1965, the project was
completed, and the five percent that had been retained was paid to the
contractor on June 7, 1965. Unsuccessful in collecting money due for
materials, a material supplier to a subcontractor sued on the prime con-
tractor's bond. The contractor and its surety pleaded the statute of lim-
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 37-237 (Supp. 1983). This statute states that no action in contract to
recover damages "caused by any deficiency in the design, planning, supervision or observation of
construction" to any real property improvement can be brought more than five years after sub-
stantial completion. See City of Hot Springs v. National Sur. Co., 258 Ark. 1009, 531 S.W.2d 8
(1975).
50. Under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-606 (1979), actions brought upon bonds required for the
repair or construction of projects by the state or any political subdivision under ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-604 (1979) must be brought within six months of the date the final payment is made on the
contract. This six-month time period is also imposed by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-636 (1971) upon
claims on bonds required for public buildings under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-632 (Supp. 1983) or
churches and charitable institutions under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-633 (1971).
51. 179 Ark. 941, 18 S.W.2d 1017 (1929).
52. The controlling statutes in the case were the predecessors to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-632
(Supp. 1983) and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-636 (1971). See 1911 ARK. Acts 446.
53. Benton County Lumber Co., 179 Ark. at 947-48, 18 S.W.2d at 1019.
54. 242 Ark. 49, 411 S.W.2d 888 (1967).
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itations claiming that the term "final payment" in the statute referred
to payments received at the time of the completion of the project. The
court disagreed and held that payment of the five percent retained on
June 7, 1965, constituted final payment.
In the generally accepted use of the word, "final," the meaning is
simply "last"-"nothing remains to be done"-"the matter is con-
cluded." We think that the adoption of appellants' argument would do
violence to our statute, and that such a holding would create uncer-
tainty as to the beginning of the period of limitations where it pres-
ently appears to be quite clear.5'
Section 14-606 would also seem to control the statute of limitations for
bonds required for state highway projects.' 6
Although sureties have attempted to shorten the limitations period
by contract, the Arkansas court has not been receptive to this action. In
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Stewart Brothers Hardware,7 a
materialman sued to recover against a surety bond supplied under sec-
tion 51-634 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated, the statutory provi-
sion regulating payment bonds for private contracts."' The bond pro-
vided that no action on the bond could be brought more than one year
from the date the contractor ceased work on the project, but that if any
limitation provided by the bond was prohibited by law, then the limita-
tion would be that provided by statute. Refuting Hartford's reliance on
City of Hot Springs v. National Surety Co.,' the court repeated the
test announced in the City of Hot Springs case. "We held that the
parties were free to contract for a limitation shorter than the general
five-year statute applicable to written instruments if the stipulated time
was not unreasonably short 'and the agreement did not contravene
some statutory requirement.' "6 Since the one-year time period from
the date the contractor ceased work on the project would have expired
prior to the six-month final payment date under section 51-636, the
55. Id. at 53-54, 411 S.W.2d at 890.
56. Although ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-217 (1981) states that claims on the bond must be filed
with the Secretary of the State Highway Commission within 30 days of the completion of the
work or within six months of the abandonment of the project by the contractor, the court in
Consolidated Indem. & Ins. Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., 187 Ark. 131, 58 S.W.2d 928
(1933) held that those requirements were impliedly repealed by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-606
(1979). See also Great Am. Indem. Co. v. State ex rel. Ark. Bitumuls Co., 231 Ark. 181, 328
S.W.2d 504 (1959).
57. 285 Ark. 352, 687 S.W.2d 128 (1985).
58. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-634 (1971).
59. 258 Ark. 1009, 531 S.W.2d 8 (1975).
60. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 285 Ark. at 353-54, 687 S.W.2d at 129.
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court held the provision invalid and the bond to be controlled by the
six-month period of section 51-636.
Distinguishing the types of obligations assumed by the surety, the
court has managed to avoid the harsh effects of the shorter statutes of
limitations. One such distinction has been the indemnification the bond
seeks to provide. If the bond provides coverage which is not required by
statute, the court has held that the bond is a common law bond and is
thus controlled by the longer five-year limitation." Assuming the obli-
gation of the contractor upon default and becoming a completing
surety62 will also place the action outside of the six-month limitation
period. 63
V. Default of the Contractor
Without hesitation, one can safely conclude that the default of the
contractor creates a critical situation for all parties. The contractor,
having defaulted possibly because of financial difficulties, faces not only
the prospect of a future lawsuit but also the possible loss of its invest-
ment in the project. As the financial guarantor of the contractor's per-
formance, the surety stands to lose up to and possibly above the penal
sum of the bond. The owner and the project's lenders, meanwhile, wish
to see the project completed within the contract price and in accor-
dance with the project specifications. Therefore, every party is inter-
ested in having the project completed at a minimum of additional cost
and without incurring any further liability.
Upon default of the contractor, the surety may choose among sev-
eral options in remedying the default. The surety's choice will depend
not only upon satisfying its obligations under the performance bond at
a minimum of cost and risk but also on protecting its right to any re-
maining contract funds and its right of indemnity." Typically, the op-
61. See City of Hot Springs v. National Sur. Co., 258 Ark. 1009, 531 S.W.2d 8 (1975)
(guaranty of workmanship and materials is common law obligation); State ex rel. Berry Asphalt
Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 223 Ark. 344, 266 S.W.2d 835 (1954) (protection against default of
contractor and defective workmanship is a common law obligation).
62. See infra notes 67-70.
63. In Argonaut Ins. Co. v. M & P Equip. Co., 269 Ark. 302, 601 S.W.2d 824 (1980), the
prime contractor defaulted on a road construction project and the surety employed another con-
tractor to finish the construction. More than six months after the final payment, a subcontractor
brought suit to recover monies due on the project. Noting that the action was based not on the
original surety contract but upon the surety's promise to pay the balance due after the surety
assumed completion, the court refused to apply the six-month statute of limitations. The surety's
assumption of completion of the contract replaced the surety agreement with a new and different
obligation. Contra Southern Sur. Co. v. Simon, 172 Ark. 924, 290 S.W. 960 (1927).
64. Petro, supra note 3, at 539-40.
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tions available to the surety are: (1) To persuade the original contrac-
tor to return to the job and perform according to the original contract;
(2) to pay damages to the owner and various other claimants under the
bond up to the penal sum; (3) to do nothing, allow the owner to remedy
the default, and indemnify the owner for the cost of completion; (4) to
finance the original contractor to enable it to complete; (5) to negotiate
an agreement between the owner and a new contractor who will com-
plete the project; or (6) to complete the project itself by utilizing the
original contractor or another contractor. Various factors, such as cost,
control over the project, and exposure to additional liability, will dic-
tate which option the surety will choose6 5 since certain choices will ex-
pand the liability or forfeit rights which the surety will normally
possess.
As with any other insurance contract, the owner may be required
to give notice of the contractor's default to the surety. Although not
required in the absence of an agreement," failure to give notice as re-
quired by the provisions of the bond has been held to forfeit the bond's
protection.67 However, the owner in giving notice will not be held to
any higher standard than required by the bond.6
One course of action that the surety may pursue upon the default
of the contractor is to complete the contract itself. Often, only a few
problems prevent completion of the project, and the surety finds that it
is economically advantageous to complete the contract rather than pay
damages under the performance bond. This action, however, forfeits
the surety's protection of the penal sum of the bond, the usual limit of
the surety's liability. The courts have held that by taking over the con-
tract and assuming the liabilities of the contractor, the surety becomes
primarily liable under the contract to the owner, and the surety's liabil-
65. Id.; Thompson, Completion Options Available to a Performance Bond Surety Other
Than Financing Its Principal, XVII FORUM 1215 (1982).
66. Jones v. Gaines, 92 Ark. 519, 123 S.W. 667 (1909).
67. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Watts, 118 Ark. 492, 177 S.W. 20 (1915).
68. The surety in Nick Peay Constr. Co. v. Miller, 100 Ark. 284, 139 S.W. 1107 (1911)
contended that the notice given by the owner was improper, thereby relieving the surety of any
liability. The bond required that written notice be given to the surety within five days of default
together with a verified statement of the facts. The owner gave notice by letter which stated that
the contractor had abandoned the project. Although unsworn, the letter was found sufficient since
only the statement of facts, and not the notice, was to be verified.
It is true that this notice was not sworn to, but it was not stipulated in the bond that it
should be. Since it advised that the contract had been wholly abandoned by the con-
tractor, it was not necessary to make any further statement of the facts, nor contem-
plated that it should be further verified . . ..
Id. at 294, 139 S.W. at 1111.
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ity is no longer limited by the penal sum.69 The significance of this rule,
of course, is that the surety's liability can be dramatically increased if
it chooses to complete the contract.
While Arkansas has yet to specifically recognize this theory, the
practical effect of the cases in this area has the same result. In South-
ern Surety Co. v. Phillips, 70 the court held the surety of a highway
project liable for various claims which were not covered by the terms of
the bond. After the contractor's default, the surety and the contractor
executed an assignment which provided that the surety would assume
the liabilities of the contractor and would receive money due from the
state highway department. In the view of the court, the assignment was
a valid contractual obligation which obligated the surety to pay all law-
ful claims arising from the project. 1 The court, in United States Fidel-
ity & Guaranty Co. v. Sellers,72 likewise held that the surety had obli-
gated itself as a joint contractor by executing a contract with the owner
and the contractor to complete the project. Other Arkansas cases have
recognized that one who is a "completing surety" stands in a different
position from one who is not.7
VI. Coverage of the Bond
Once default on a construction contract occurs, the primary focus
centers upon the coverage of the bond. As a surety bond is in reality no
more than a contract, the terms of the bond will normally control the
question of coverage. The exception to this rule lies in the fact that the
terms of certain bonds are controlled by statute.
Two separate sections outline the coverage of statutory bonds.
First, section 14-604 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated requires
surety bonds for the repair and construction of public improvements
and mandates that the surety shall be liable for:
Claims for labor and materials shall include but not be limited to fuel
oil, gasoline, camp equipment, food for men, feed for animals, premi-
ums for bonds and liability and workmen's compensation insurance,
rentals on machinery, equipment and draft animals; and also for taxes
69. See, e.g., Caron v. Andrew, 133 Cal. App. 2d 402, 284 P.2d 544 (1955); Klein v. J.D. &
J.M. Collins, 159 La. 704, 106 So. 120 (1925).
70. 181 Ark. 14, 24 S.W.2d 870 (1930).
71. Id. at 24, 24 S.W.2d at 874.
72. 160 Ark. 599, 255 S.W. 26 (1923).
73. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. M & P Equip. Co., 269 Ark. 302, 601 S.W.2d 824 (1980) (six-
month statute of limitations under ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-606 (1979) did not prevent suit against
surety who assumed completion); Southern Sur. Co. v. Simon, 172 Ark. 924, 290 S.W. 960 (1927)
(court held evidence insufficient that surety assumed completion).
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or payments due the State of Arkansas or any political subdivision
thereof which shall have arisen on account of or in connection with
wages earned by workmen on the project covered by the bond."
A similar statute, section 51-632 of the Arkansas Statutes Annotated,
likewise requires a bond for the construction or repair of public im-
provements, but the application of this statute is limited to contracts
exceeding $10,000. 7" Its coverage is also similar to that of section 14-
604.70 Although separate and distinct, these statutes do not contem-
plate the requirement of two bonds for any one project; rather, the pur-
pose of section 14-604 is to designate certain claims which are to be
covered by the bond." Nevertheless, an obvious difference between the
two sections seems to be that section 51-63578 would require a perform-
ance obligation whereas section 14-604 would not.
An issue which has arisen frequently has been whether certain
materials are within the coverage of the bond, a question which the
Arkansas courts have liberally answered in favor of the materialman or
laborer. Having supplied various materials and hand tools to a subcon-
tractor on a highway project, the appellee in National Surety Corp. v.
Ideal Lumber Co. 7 9 sued the surety to recover the amount owed on the
subcontractor's account. Citing Heltzel Steel Form & Iron Co. v. Fi-
delity & Deposit Co.,80 the surety defended on the ground that the
74. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-604 (1979).
75. No contract in any sum exceeding $10,000 providing for the repair, alteration, or
erection of any public building, public structure or public improvement shall be entered
into by the State of Arkansas, or any subdivision thereof, any county, municipality,
school district, other local taxing unit, or by any agency of any of the foregoing, unless
the contractor shall furnish to the party letting the contract a bond in a sum equal to
the amount of the contract.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-632 (Supp. 1985). See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-638 (1971) (bond
statutes do not apply to state highway contracts) and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-217 (1981) (bonds
required for state highway projects shall be conditioned as the Arkansas State Highway Commis-
sion may require).
76. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-635 (1971) states that the bond required under ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-632 shall cover the contractor's performance of the contract and shall pay for labor or mater-
ials furnished for the construction or repair. This coverage is also part of bonds for the construc-
tion of certain charitable institutions and bonds furnished to private improvements. See ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 51-633 and 51-634 (1971), respectively.
77. State ex rel. Berry Asphalt Co. v. Western Sur. Co., 223 Ark. 344, 266 S.W.2d 835
(1954).
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-635 (1971).
79. 249 Ark. 545, 460 S.W.2d 55 (1970).
80. 168 Ark. 728, 271 S.W. 325 (1925). Therein, the appellant had sued to recover the
purchase price of steel forms used to construct a road. The court held that while the forms may
have been essential to the construction, they fell outside of the bond's protection since they did not
become part of the constructed improvement. See also Pierce Oil Co. v. Parker, 168 Ark. 400, 271
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tools formed no part of the improvement and therefore were not pro-
tected by the bond. The court nevertheless held the tools to be within
the coverage of the bond. Without much explanation, the court noted
that the case of Detroit Fidelity & Surety Co. v. Yaffee Iron & Metal
Co.8 had changed the Heltzel rule. The apparent reason for the dis-
tinction between the cases is the wording of the statutes. In Heltzel, the
surety bond had been based upon section 5446 of the Crawford and
Moses Digest.82 Similar in wording to section 51-635 of the Arkansas
Statutes Annotated, the statute allowed claims for those supplying la-
bor and materials to the project.88 The statute in Ideal Lumber and
Yaffee Iron was section 14-604, which by its own terms covers materi-
als or labor not incorporated into the project but necessary for its con-
struction. The distinction becomes important if a bond was required by
section 51-635 but not by the terms of section 14-604. In that instance,
the bond's protection would cover only labor and materials incorpo-
rated directly into the project if the Heltzel decision is followed.
Outside the question of whether the materials have been incorpo-
rated into a specific project, the court has limited the coverage of such
bonds. For example, the court in Fausett Builders, Inc. v. Globe In-
demnity Co." held that the owner could not recover from the surety on
a performance bond the amount of attorney's fees spent defending
claims filed after the default of the contractor. Since the contract was
one of ordinary suretyship rather than an indemnity agreement, the
court reasoned that the right of recovery against the surety did not
extend beyond the liability of the contractor. No agreement to reim-
burse the owner existed; therefore, the surety also was held not liable.
In addition, the court has refused to hold a surety company liable for
goods sold to a subcontractor when the goods were never used nor in-
S.W. 24 (1925).
81. 184 Ark. 1095, 44 S.W.2d 1085 (1932).
82. Act of March 30, 1915, no. 338, § 30, 1915 Ark. Acts 1400, 1429-30.
83. Contractor's bond. All contractors shall be required to give bond for the faithful
performance of such contracts as may be awarded to them with good and sufficient
security in an amount to be fixed by the board of commissioners, and said bond shall
contain an additional obligation that such contractor, or contractors, shall promptly
make payment to all persons, supply him, or them, labor and materials in the prosecu-
tion of work provided for in such contract. Suit may be brought by and in the name of
the district upon the bond given to the board. Any person, individual or corporation
supplying labor and material shall have the right of action, and shall be authorized to
bring suit in the name of the district for his, their, or its use and benefit against said
contractor and surety, and to prosecute same to final judgment and execution, but such
action and its prosecution shall involve the district in no expense whatsoever.
Crawford and Moses Digest of the Statutes of Arkansas § 5446 (1921).
84. 220 Ark. 301, 247 S.W.2d 469 (1952).
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tended to be used on the bonded project.85
To determine which parties supplying materials or labor are cov-
ered by the bond, the court has distinguished between the obligations
under common law bonds and statutory bonds. If the bond is a common
law obligation, its terms control the coverage. The surety may extend
or restrict the coverage as it pleases since the contractual terms con-
trol.86 The coverage of a statutory bond, on the other hand, must con-
form to the statute,8 7 and the court in Sweetser Construction Co. v.
Newman Brothers, Inc. adopted the "privity of contract" rule to deter-
mine which parties may claim against the bond. 88 Stated simply, the
supplier must be in privity with the principal before he can recover on
the bond. In Sweetser Construction Co. the contractor agreed to build
a dormitory for the University of Arkansas and furnished a bond pur-
suant to sections 51-632 and 51-635 of the Arkansas Statutes Anno-
tated. Sweetser Construction placed an order for materials with Fort
Smith Structural Steel Company which, in turn, contracted with
United Iron and Steel Company. United then purchased the materials
from the appellee. Appellee later brought suit against Sweetser Con-
struction and its surety for the purchase price. Reversing the lower
court's ruling, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the supplier must
be in privity of contract before it can recover on the bond.
"[O]ne who supplies material to a materialman, who in turn supplies
the subcontractor, is to be relegated to the status of a stranger to the
original contract, since such person's contract or undertaking is
neither with the principal contractor, nor with one who, as in the case
of a subcontractor, deals directly with the principal contractor. Such
person's contract is therefore but indirect and collateral to the original
contract, and for want of privity does not serve to bring such party
within the purview of the principal contractor's bond." 89
The court was quick to point out, however, that coverage would be af-
85. Proctor Tire Serv., Inc. v. National Sur. Corp., 242 Ark. 695, 415 S.W.2d 45 (1967).
86. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Crane Co., 178 Ark. 676, 12 S.W.2d 872 (1928). Mansfield
Lumber Co. v. National Sur. Co., 176 Ark. 1035, 5 S.W.2d 294 (1928).
87. "The bond sued on is a statutory bond, and such bonds executed in the form prescribed
by the statute are to be construed, as respects the rights of both principal and surety, as though
the law requiring and regulating them were written in them." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v.
Detroit Fidelity & Sur. Co., 187 Ark. 97, 100, 58 S.W.2d 418, 419 (1933). See also River Valley,
Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 287 Ark. 386, 699 S.W.2d 745 (1985); Fausett Builders, Inc. v.
Globe Indem. Co., 220 Ark. 301, 247 S.W.2d 469 (1952); Detroit Fidelity & Sur. Co. v. Yaffee
Iron & Metal Co., 184 Ark. 1095, 44 S.W.2d 1085 (1932).
88. 236 Ark. 939, 371 S.W.2d 515 (1963).
89. Id. at 943, 371 S.W.2d at 517 (quoting City of St. Louis v. Kaplan-McGowan Co., 233
Mo. App. 789, 108 S.W.2d 987 (1937)).
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forded to a materialman supplying materials directly to a
subcontractor."°
Although yet to be addressed by the Arkansas courts, the question
of the surety's liability for torts committed by the principal against
third parties has been the subject of some debate. For the most part,
this contention has not received much support from the courts. Only
one Louisiana case, Bullard v. State, through the Department of
Transportation and Development,91 has held a surety liable for tort
claims. However, the overwhelming majority of the decisions have not
allowed tort claims against the surety, reasoning that a surety bond is
not a general liability policy but a limited purpose fund for the benefit
of those persons covered by the bond and applicable statutes."2 One
such case is Tri-State Insurance Co. v. United States,93 an Eighth Cir-
cuit decision arising out of the Western District of Arkansas. In that
decision, the United States sued the owner, lender, and surety for dam-
ages it sustained for loss of lateral support which occurred during the
construction. Although the language of the bond broadly indemnified
against all damages suffered by the owner for the failure of the con-
tractor to perform its contract," the court held that the terms of the
bond were not so broad as to allow a third-party tort claim since the
surety's obligations were based upon the contractor's nonperformance
of the contract. 95
90. Id. at 943-44, 371 S.W.2d at 517-18.
91. 394 So.2d 626 (La. Ct. App. 1980). In Bullard the bond stated that it would indemnify
against "any loss or damage of whatever kind and character arising or occasioned by deeds of
negligence" by the principal or its agents. Id. at 627-28. Refusing the surety's defense that the
bond was a statutory bond and therefore any language outside of the statute was meaningless, the
court held that the statutory provisions did not prohibit the surety from providing coverage not
required by the act and that the surety was bound by the terms of the bond.
92. See Barker, Third-Party Tort Claimants and the Contract Bond Surety, 5 THE CON-
STRUCTION LAWYER 7 (Spring 1984); see also Perry, Third-Party Tort Claimants Can Recover
Against Sureties Under Construction Bonds: Is the Bond a Comprehensive General Liability Pol-
icy?, 5 THE CONSTRUCTION LAWYER 5 (April 1985).
93. 340 F.2d 542 (8th Cir. 1965).
94. Id. at 543-44, n.l.
95. Even if the seemingly broad language obligating appellant to indemnify the obligees
for all cost and damage incurred as a result of the contractor's failure to fully perform
its contract is taken as impliedly for the benefit of appellee, a recovery would still be
conditioned upon a showing that the building contract was breached. Here, the archi-
tect acting as agent for [the owner] specifically instructed the contractor not to backfill
until after the time the damage complained of occurred. While the [United States']
right to property damages caused by the removal of the lateral support may be absolute
as against the adjoining landowner under the law of Arkansas and other jurisdictions as
well, this is not to say that the surety's obligation is converted to one of absolute liabil-
ity beyond the terms of its bond which guarantees only performance as agreed upon by
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VII. Subrogation Rights of the Surety
One of the privileges which the surety enjoys is its equitable right
of subrogation. A surety who is forced to complete the construction
contract or pay laborers and materialmen because of the principal's de-
fault is subrogated to the rights of the principal" and also those of the
owner, the subcontractors, and the materialmen.07 The surety is re-
quired to pay the entire debt of the principal before the right of subro-
gation arises. 8 Although the right of subrogation exists independently
of any agreement between the parties, 99 this right can be modified by
contract.100 Nevertheless, the right is not absolute and may be lost
through such actions as the failure of the surety to issue a policy
through an Arkansas agent. 10 1
Most often, the remaining funds due the principal under the con-
struction contract are the subject of the subrogation rights. Once the
amounts due the owner, the subcontractors, and materialmen are paid,
however, the competition for the remaining funds is generally between
the surety and the lender financing the principal. The lender, having
advanced funds to the principal and taken an assignment of the con-
tract funds due the principal, will claim the remaining funds due the
principal on the contract, while the surety will claim the remaining
funds under its subrogation rights. The competing claims result in a
the contractor and the owner-obligee.
Id. at 546.
96. See River Valley, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 287 Ark. 386, 699 S.W.2d 745
(1985); Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Texarkana School Dist., 227 Ark. 759, 301 S.W.2d 453
(1957); City of Texarkana v. F.W. Offenhauser & Co., 182 Ark. 201, 31 S.W.2d 140 (1930);
American Bank & Trust Co. v. Langston, 180 Ark. 643, 22 S.W.2d 381 (1929).
97. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 120 Ark. 519, 179 S.W. 1019
(1915); 83 C.J.S. Subrogation § 59 (1953).
98. Barton v. Matthews, 141 Ark. 262, 216 S.W. 693 (1919).
99. A. STEARNS, supra note 2, § 11.1, at 439.
100. Peay v. Southern Sur. Co., 141 Ark. 265, 216 S.W. 722 (1919). The court in Peay
upheld the surety's right of subrogation against the contractor's contention that the claim paid by
the surety was invalid. Noting that the surety contract provided that the contractor would indem-
nify the surety for all good faith payments, the court expanded the subrogation rights of the
surety to conform with the contract.
101. American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Builders United Constr. Inc., 272 Ark. 179, 613
S.W.2d 379 (1981). In this case, the surety policy had not been issued by an Arkansas agent as
required by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-2221 (1980). Following the rule that a contract prohibited by
statute is void, the court refused to allow the surety to recover money paid on the contractor's
behalf. See also ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-605 (1979) (bonds required for public construction con-
tractors must be issued by a surety company licensed to do business in Arkansas and executed by
a licensed local agent) and ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-635 (1971) (bonds for private building contrac-
tors, churches, or charitable institution must be executed by a surety company authorized to do
business in Arkansas).
CONSTRUCTION BONDS
classic battle between claimants over a limited, and often inadequate,
fund.
In such cases, the surety has gained the superior position. Once
the surety has fully performed the principal's obligations, the surety's
subrogation rights vest and relate back to the time of the execution of
the bond.
Under the doctrine of equitable subrogation a surety taking over and
completing the contract of the defaulting contractor is subrogated to
the rights of the contractor with respect to the funds due the contrac-
tor. Such rights are superior to those of a mere assignee of the money.
These rights become vested at the time the surety provides full satis-
faction for default and relate back to the time the bond or contract of
suretyship was entered into.10
The claim of subrogation will extend to the amount of funds expended
by the surety as required by the bond but will not extend to those items
for which the surety had no obligation under the bond. 103
The surety's recovery, however, may not be limited to the remain-
ing contract funds. The assignee lender may also be exposed to liability
for the principal's failure to perform. Although stating its decision was
a narrow one, the court in Benton State Bank v. Warren'" held an
assignee lender liable for the assignor contractor's failure to pay labor-
ers and materialmen. In that case, monthly progress payments were
made to the contractor for ninety percent of the work performed the
preceding month. As security for money advanced to it, the contractor
assigned its progress payments to the lender. Typically, the contractor
would apply for a progress payment from the lender who would in turn
send it to the owner along with a request that the check be payable to
the lender and the contractor. In addition, the contractor would certify
to the lender that materialmen and laborers had been paid. Stating
that the decision was based upon which party, the owner or lender, was
more at fault, the court cited Farmers Acceptance Corp. v. DeLozier 06
and the provisions of section 85-9-318(1) of the Arkansas Statutes An-
notated. 106 The court affirmed the lower court's decision that the owner
102. Equilease Corp. v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 262 Ark. 689, 692, 565
S.W.2d 125, 126 (1978).
103. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Langston, 180 Ark. 643, 22 S.W.2d 381 (1929).
104. 263 Ark. 1, 562 S.W.2d 74 (1978).
105. 178 Colo. 291, 496 P.2d 1016 (1972).
106. The applicable portion of ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-318(1) (Supp. 1985) states:
Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or
claims arising out of a sale as provided in Section 9-206 [§ 85-9-206], the rights of an
assignee are subject to (a) all the terms of the contract between the account debtor and
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could recover the progress payments from the lender. 107
If the Benton State Bank decision is followed, the contest between
the surety and the lender may turn from a battle over remaining funds
to a contest over the lender's potential liability pursuant to the assign-
ment. Although the court relied heavily upon the facts of that particu-
lar case, the case illustrates the present split of authority over the im-
pact of section 9-318(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code as to
whether an affirmative liability upon the lender is created by that sec-
tion, or whether the section only allows the interposition of defenses
against an action by the lender.108 Nevertheless, Benton State Bank
contradicts the general rule that an assignment of rights is not nor-
mally a delegation of the duties of the assignor unless there is an ex-
press assumption by the assignee, or the circumstances indicate
otherwise.109
Conclusion
For the most part, Arkansas law provides few surprises in the area
of construction bonds since the decisions have generally followed the
majority positions. Nevertheless, some questions, such as the extent
that a surety's obligations will be extinguished upon a premature pro-
gress payment 1  and the expanded liability of a completing surety,"'
have yet to be either presented to or clearly answered by the court.
Overall, the decisions demonstrate a conservative approach.
However, some Arkansas decisions may prove to be significant.
Benton State Bank v. Warren" ' may signal an opportunity of the
surety to recover funds from a lender who has received progress pay-
assignor and any defense or claim arising therefrom; and (b) any other defense or claim
of the account debtor against the assignor which accrues before the account debtor
receives notification of the assignment.
107. 263 Ark. at 6-7, 562 S.W.2d at 77.
108. See, e.g., Lydig Constr. Inc. v. Rainier Nat'l Bank, 40 Wash. App. 141, 697 P.2d 1019
(1985) and cases cited therein.
109. Unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary, as in an assign-
ment for security, an assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the con-
tract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of the assignor's
rights and a delegation of his unperformed duties under the contract.
Newton v. Merchants & Farmers Bank of Dumas, 11 Ark. App. 167, 171, 668 S.W.2d 51, 52
(1984) (quoting from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 328(1) (1979)). Therein, the
court held that an assignee lender of a subcontractor did not assume the contractor's obligation to
pay materialmen and laborers and that it was entitled to the remaining contract payments as
against the prime contractor.
110. See supra notes 29-31.
111. See supra notes 67-70.
112. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
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ments pursuant to an assignment. Although the court stated that its
holding was a limited one, the principle behind the decision, coupled
with the surety's right of subrogation, could prove to be a powerful
weapon to recover funds received by the lender. Lenders may find
themselves facing an entirely new type of liability, which was probably
never intended or contemplated. On the other hand, the court may
stand by its caveat and severely restrict the effect of the decision. For
now, one can only speculate whether the rights and liabilities of sure-
ties will be expanded or diminished.

